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Abstract
Differentially private synthetic data generation offers a recent solution to release an-
alytically useful data while preserving the privacy of individuals in the data. In order
to utilize these algorithms for public policy decisions, policymakers need an accurate
understanding of these algorithms’ comparative performance. Correspondingly, data
practitioners also require standard metrics for evaluating the analytic qualities of the
synthetic data. In this paper, we present an in-depth evaluation of several differentially
private synthetic data algorithms using actual differentially private synthetic data sets
created by contestants in the recent National Institute of Standards and Technology
Public Safety Communications Research (NIST PSCR) Division’s “Differential Pri-
vacy Synthetic Data Challenge.” We offer analyses of these algorithms based on both
the accuracy of the data they create and their usability by potential data providers.
We frame the methods used in the NIST PSCR data challenge within the broader
differentially private synthetic data literature. We implement additional utility met-
rics, including two of our own, on the differentially private synthetic data and compare
mechanism utility on three categories. Our comparative assessment of the differentially
private data synthesis methods and the quality metrics shows the relative usefulness,
general strengths and weaknesses, preferred choices of algorithms and metrics. Finally
we describe the implications of our evaluation for policymakers seeking to implement
differentially private synthetic data algorithms on future data products.
Keywords— differential privacy, synthetic data, utility, evaluation, statistical disclosure control
1 Introduction
1.1 Background on Differentially Private Synthetic Data
The collection and dissemination of data can greatly benefit society by enabling a range of im-
pactful research projects, such as the Personal Genome Project Canada database which determines
Genomic variants in participants for several health problems (Reuter et al., 2018), the United King-
dom Medical Education Database “to improve standards, facility workforce planning and support
the regulation of medical education and training” (Dowell et al., 2018), and the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation 500 Cities Project that provided a large United States data set that “con-
tain[ed] estimates for 27 indicators of adult chronic disease, unhealthy behaviors, and preventative
care available” as a “groundbreaking resource for establishing baseline conditions, advocating for
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investments in health, and targeting program resources where they are needed most” (Scally et al.,
2017). However, sharing data based on human subjects with potential sensitive information often
raises valid concerns over the privacy risks inherit in sharing data, and recent misuses of data ac-
cess for seemingly research purposes, such as the Facebook - Cambridge Analytica Scandal, have
heightened data privacy concerns over how both private companies and government organizations
gather and disseminate information (Gonza´lez et al., 2019; Martin et al., 2017; Tsay-Vogel et al.,
2018).
Statistical disclosure control (SDC), or limitation (SDL), exists as a field of study that aims to
develop methods for releasing high-quality data products while preserving the confidentiality of
sensitive data. These techniques have existed within statistics, the social sciences, and government
agencies since the mid-twentieth century, and they seek to balance risk against the benefit to
society, also known as the utility of the data (we will use quality and utility interchangeably in
this paper). SDC methods require strong assumptions concerning the knowledge and identification
strategies of the attacker, and risk is estimated by simulating these attackers (Hundepool et al.,
2012; Manrique-Vallier and Reiter, 2012; Reiter, 2005).
While this field has existed for some time, over the past two decades the data landscape has
dramatically changed. Data adversaries (also referred to as intruders or attackers) can more easily
reconstruct data sets and identify individuals from supposedly anonymized data using advances in
modern information infrastructure and computational power. Examples of re-identified anonymized
data include the Netflix Prize data set (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008), the Washington State
health records (Sweeney, 2013), credit card metadata (De Montjoye et al., 2015), cell phone spatial
data (De Montjoye et al., 2013; Hardesty, 2013; Kondor et al., 2018), and the United States public
use microdata files (Rocher et al., 2019). Due to the increased availability to external data files
and methods for reconstructing information from data, researchers have fewer reasons to assume
that we can protect the data based on simulating all types of plausible adversaries.
In the past two decades, a new concept, known as differential privacy (DP), has been developed
to combat this perceived heightened risk of privacy loss. This theory originated in the theoretical
computer science community, and Dwork et al. (2006b) proposed the first formal definition of
differential privacy for quantifying the privacy loss when releasing information from a confidential
data set. In contrast to prior SDC methods, this theory does not require a simulated attacker
or the same strong assumptions concerning how much information an intruder may have or what
kind of disclosure is likely to occur. At a high level, DP links the potential for privacy loss to how
much the answer of a query (such as a statistic) is changed given the absence or presence of the
most extreme possible person in the population of the data. The level of protection required is set
proportional to this maximum potential change, and thereby providing formal privacy protections
scaled to the worst-case scenario. For further details, Dwork and Roth (2014) provides a rigorous
mathematical review of DP while Nissim et al. (2017) and Snoke and Bowen (2019) describe DP
for a non-technical, general audience. Since its conception, DP has created an entire new field
of research with applications in Bayesian learning (Wang et al., 2015), data mining (Mohammed
et al., 2011), data streaming (Dwork et al., 2010), dimension reduction (Chaudhuri et al., 2012), eye
tracking (Liu et al., 2019), genetic associate tests (Yu et al., 2014), inferential statistical analyses
(Karwa et al., 2016; Wasserman and Zhou, 2010), power grid obfuscation (Fioretto et al., 2019),
and recommender systems (Friedman et al., 2016) to list a few.
Another innovation in SDC is a technique known as synthetic data generation, and it has become
a leading practical approach for releasing publicly available data that can be used for exploratory
purposes and numerous different analyses (Drechsler, 2011; Little, 1993; Raab et al., 2016; Raghu-
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nathan et al., 2003; Reiter, 2005; Rubin, 1993). While this approach has been shown to offer
improvements in preserving the utility of the data compared against other SDC methods, its main
limitation remains the same as other SDC approaches, the lack of a formal privacy quantification.
Within the large body of DP literature, researchers have more recently considered the combina-
tion of DP and data synthesis as a solution to releasing analytically useful data while preserving
the privacy of individuals in the data. Applications include binary data (Charest, 2011; McClure
and Reiter, 2012), categorical data (Abowd and Vilhuber, 2008; Hay et al., 2010), continuous
data (Bowen and Liu, 2020; Snoke and Slavkovic´, 2018; Wasserman and Zhou, 2010), network
data (Karwa et al., 2017, 2016), and Poisson distributed data (Quick, 2019). In order to utilize
these algorithms for public policy decisions, policymakers need an accurate understanding of these
algorithms’ comparative performance. However, there are very few studies comparing multiple dif-
ferentially private data synthesis methods and, to the best of our knowledge, no studies applying
the comparisons on real-world data. Correspondingly, data practitioners wishing to produce dif-
ferentially private synthetic data are unlikely to know what algorithms fit their application or find
information concerning the relative strengths and weaknesses of different approaches.
1.2 Contributions of This Paper
In this paper, we provide an in-depth assessment of various differentially private data synthesis
methods applied to multiple real, non-trivial data sets and evaluated on a variety of utility metrics.
The source for this study comes from the 2018 National Institute of Standards and Technology
Public Safety Communication Research (NIST PSCR) Division’s “Differential Privacy Synthetic
Data Challenge” (Vendetti, 2018). Due to the competitive nature of the challenge, final scores had
to be aggregated such that more academic evaluations of the algorithms’ performances were not
possible.
In our assessment, we evaluate the differentially private data synthesis mechanisms based on their
performance in the challenge and on a wider range of utility metrics. We provide descriptions of
each algorithm and consider their ease of implementation, such as the availability of open-source
code, computational feasibility, and the amount of public data pre-processing required. We also
note algorithms’ current standing as published concepts in the literature.
Additionally, we expand on the scoring metrics devised for the challenge and evaluate the synthetic
data sets on a variety of other standard metrics in the data privacy utility literature. For readers
unfamiliar with different ways to evaluate accuracy, this paper offers a concise and well-organized
set of metrics that form a broad utility assessment. We organize the utility metrics used to assess
the synthetic data in one of three groups: (1) marginal distribution metrics, (2) joint distribution
metrics, and (3) correlation metrics. Using the actual synthetic data sets generated by contestants
in the challenge, which were made available to us by NIST PSCR, we implemented multiple metrics
in each of these categories. We also assigned each of the three NIST PSCR Data Challenge scoring
measures to one of these categories.
The categories provide our evaluation of the differentially private synthetic data algorithms a broad
analysis of the relative usefulness, ranging from specific measures of model accuracy to general
measures of distributional similarity. We provide recommendations for best candidate methods,
the first such recommendations based on a large-scale real data application, for future use based on
their strengths and weaknesses. We provide policymakers and practitioners seeking to implement
differentially private synthetic data algorithms both an assessment of the algorithms used in the
challenge and a framework for evaluating future differentially private synthetic data techniques.
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We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 reviews the definitions and concepts
of differential privacy and common differentially private mechanisms. Section 3 summarizes the
differentially private data synthesis methods ranked in the NIST PSCR Data Challenge, and Section
4 describes the quality metrics we implemented on the NIST PSCR Data Challenge data sets.
Section 5 evaluates and compares all the quality metric results. Concluding remarks and suggestions
for future work are given in Section 6.
2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) offers privacy protection with a provable and quantifiable amount, collo-
quially referred to as the privacy-loss budget. DP is a statement about the algorithm (or mecha-
nism), not a statement about the data. Rather than stating that the output data meets privacy
requirements, DP requires that the algorithm which produces the output provably meets the defini-
tions. Accordingly, algorithms which satisfy the definitions are referred to as differentially private
algorithms.
In this section, we reproduce the pertinent definitions and theorems of DP with the following
notation: X ∈ R is the original data set with dimension n× q and X∗ is the private version of X
with dimension n∗ × q. We also define a statistical query as a function u : Rn×q → Rk, where the
function maps the possible data sets of X to k real numbers.
2.1 Definitions and Theorems
Definition 1. Differential Privacy (Dwork et al., 2006b): A sanitization algorithm, M, gives
-DP if for all subsets S ⊆ Range(M) and for all X,X ′ such that d(X,X ′) = 1,
Pr(M(X) ∈ S)
Pr(M(X ′) ∈ S) ≤ exp() (1)
where  > 0 is the privacy-loss budget and d(X,X ′) = 1 represents the possible ways that X ′ differs
from X by one record. We define this difference as a presence or absence of a record, but note that
some definitions of DP has this difference as a change, where X and X ′ have the same dimensions.
One concern about algorithms that satisfy -DP is they tend to inject a large amount of noise to
statistical query results to attain a strong privacy guarantee. Several relaxations of -DP have been
developed such as approximate DP (Dwork et al., 2006a), probabilistic DP (Machanavajjhala et al.,
2008), and concentrated DP (Dwork and Rothblum, 2016). These are called relaxations because,
while still formal, they offer slightly weaker privacy guarantees. In return, they typically lessen the
amount of noise required. We will cover approximate DP, also known as (, δ)-DP, since the NIST
PSCR Data Challenge allowed the submissions to satisfy (, δ)-DP rather than strict -DP.
Definition 2. (, δ)-Differential Privacy (Dwork et al., 2006a): A sanitization algorithm M
gives (, δ)-DP if for all X,X ′ that are d(X,X ′) = 1,
Pr(M(X) ∈ S) ≤ exp() Pr(M(X ′) ∈ S) + δ (2)
where δ ∈ [0, 1]. Central -DP is a special case of (, δ)-DP when δ = 0.
The parameter δ adds a small probability that the bound given in Definition 1 does not hold, which
can be useful when dealing with extreme yet very unlikely cases.
Many DP algorithms have multiple outputs, such as multiple synthetic data sets or repeated re-
sponses from a query system. Each time a statistic or output is released, data information “leaks”,
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and therefore needs protecting. This is done by splitting the amount of  used for each output, and
the composition theorems formalize this idea.
Theorem 1. Composition Theorems (McSherry, 2009): Suppose a mechanism, M, provides
j-DP for j = 1, . . . , k.
a) Sequential Composition:
The sequence of Mj(X) applied on the same X provides (
∑
j j ,
∑
j δj)-DP.
b) Parallel Composition:
Let Dj be disjoint subsets of the input domain D. The sequence of Mj(X ∩ Dj) provides
max(j , δj)-DP.
To put it more simply, suppose there are k many statistical queries on X. The composition
theorems state that the data practitioner may allocate a portion of the overall desired level of  to
each statistic by sequential composition. A typical appropriation is equally dividing up  by k. For
example, sequential composition was used by competitors in the challenge when making multiple
draws of the statistic of interest to generate multiple differentially private synthetic data sets. Some
competitors also used parallel composition, i.e., k statistical queries are applied to a disjoint set
of X with no additional privacy-loss. For example, in a perturbed histogram, where the bins are
disjoint subsets of the data, noise can be added to each bin independently without needing to split
.
Another important theorem is the post-processing theorem which states that any function applied
to a differentially private output is also differentially private.
Theorem 2. Post-Processing Theorem (Dwork et al., 2006b; Nissim et al., 2007):
IfM be a mechanism that satisfies -DP, and g be any function, then g (M(X)) also satisfies -DP.
Many differentially private synthetic data algorithms leverage this theorem, since most focus on per-
turbing the distribution parameters that represents the synthetic data. Using the post-processing
theorem, any data drawn as a function of the noisy parameters will also be differentially private.
Other examples of post-processing steps include enforcing structural aspects of the data, such as
not releasing negative values for people’s ages. Almost every contestants’ algorithm, described in
more detail in Section 3, utilizes some form of post-processing.
2.2 Differentially Private Mechanisms
Algorithms which add sufficient noise to the released data or queries such that they satisfy the
differential privacy definitions are commonly referred to as mechanisms. In this section, we present
some building-block mechanisms that are used in the -DP and (, δ)-DP algorithms developed by
the competitors for the NIST PSCR Data Challenge.
For a given value of , an algorithm that satisfies DP or approximate DP will adjust the amount of
noise added to the data based on the maximum possible change, given two databases that differ by
one row, of the statistic or data that the data practitioner wants released. This value is commonly
referred to as the global sensitivity (GS), given in Definition 3.
Definition 3. l1-Global Sensitivity (Dwork et al., 2006b): For all X,X
′ such that d(X,X ′) = 1,
the global sensitivity of a function u is
∆1u = sup
d(X,X′)=1
‖u(X)− u(X ′)‖1 (3)
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We can calculate sensitivity under different norms, for example ∆2u represents the l2 norm global
sensitivity, l2-GS, of the function u. Another way of thinking about this value is that it measures
how robust the statistical query is to outliers.
The most basic mechanism satisfying -DP is the Laplace Mechanism, given in Definition 4, first
introduced by Dwork et al. (2006b).
Definition 4. Laplace Mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006b): The Laplace Mechanism satisfies -
DP by adding noise to u that are drawn from a Laplace distribution with the location parameter at
0 and scale parameter of ∆u
−1 such that
u∗(X) = u(X) + Laplace
(
0,∆1u
−1) (4)
Another popular mechanism is the Gaussian Mechanism that satisfies (, δ)-DP, given in Definition
5, which uses the l2-GS of the statistical query.
Definition 5. Gaussian Mechanism (Dwork and Roth, 2014): The Gaussian Mechanism sat-
isfies (, δ)-DP by adding Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance, σ2, such that
u∗(X) = u(X) +N
(
0, σ2I
)
(5)
where σ = ∆2u
−1√2 log(1.25/δ).
Both the Laplace and Gaussian Mechanisms are simple and quick to implement, but only apply to
numerical values (without additional post-processing, Theorem 2). A more general -DP mechanism
is the Exponential Mechanism, given in Definition 6, which allows for the sampling of values from
a noisy distribution rather than adding noise directly. Although the Exponential Mechanism can
apply to any type of statistic, many theoretical algorithms using the Exponential Mechanism are
computationally infeasible for practical applications without limiting the possible outputs of θ. This
mechanism was not used by any of the top ranking participants, but is used in other DP synthetic
data algorithms such as those proposed by Wasserman and Zhou (2010) and Snoke and Slavkovic´
(2018).
Definition 6. Exponential Mechanism (McSherry and Talwar, 2007): The Exponential mech-
anism releases values with a probability proportional to
exp
(
u(X, θ)
2∆u
)
(6)
and satisfies -DP, where u(X, θ) is the score function that measures the quality of all the possible
outputs of θ on X.
3 Differentially Private Data Synthesis Algorithms
In this section, we review the top ranking differentially private data synthesis algorithms from the
NIST PSCR Data Challenge. Hay et al. (2016) and Bowen and Liu (2020) also offer in-depth
evaluations and assessments of other differentially private data synthesis methods not covered in
this paper, so we direct any interested readers to these papers for more information on algorithms
not found here.
This competition, sponsored by the NIST PSCR Division, called for researchers to develop practical
and viable differentially private data synthesis methods that were then scored using bespoke metrics.
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The NIST PSCR challenge consisted of three “Marathon Matches,” which spanned from November
2018 to May 2019. Each match provided the contestants with a real-world data set to train and
develop their DP methods that were identical in structure and variables to the real-world test data
used for final scoring. Contestants were also given details regarding scoring methods. Participants
had 30 days from the start of each match to develop and submit their differentially private synthetic
data algorithms. The competition required detailed proofs and code for the submissions, and the
highest scoring submissions received cash prizes. Over the 30 day period, a panel of subject matter
experts reviewed and verified that the submitted methods satisfied DP. If approved, NIST PSCR
challenge organizers applied the differentially private synthetic data methods to the test data for
final scoring.
Both Matches #1 and #2 used the San Francisco Fire Departments (SFFDs) Call for Service data,
but at different years. These data sets contained a total of 32 categorical and continuous variables
with roughly 236,000 to 314,000 observations respectively. Some of the variables are Call Type
Group, Number of Alarms, City, Zip Code of Incident, Neighborhood, Emergency Call Received
Date and Time, Emergency Call Response Date and Time, Supervisor District, and Station Area.
For Match #3, challenge participants trained their methods on the Colorado Public Use Microdata
Sample (PUMS) data, and their methods were evaluated on the Arizona and Vermont PUMS data
for final scoring. All three PUMS data sets had 98 categorical and continuous variables with the
number of observations ranging from about 210,000 to 662,000. Gender, Race, Age, City, City
Population, School, Veteran Status, Rent, and Income Wage were a few of the 98 variables. We
discuss how the NIST PSCR Differential Privacy Synthetic Data Challenge executed their scoring
in Section 4.
We categorize the differentially private data synthesis methods from the challenge into the same two
categories used in Bowen and Liu (2020), non-parametric and parametric approaches. We define
non-parametric approaches as differentially private data synthesis methods that generate data from
an empirical distribution, and we define parametric approaches as algorithms that generate the
synthetic data from a parameterized distribution or generative model.
3.1 Non-Parametric Data Synthesis
Most non-parametric differentially private synthetic data techniques work by sanitizing the cell
counts or proportions of a cross-tabulation of the data (e.g., the full cross-tabulation of all variables).
To provide a synthetic microdata file, or when the original data has continuous variables, the
non-parametric approaches will sample data from an empirical distribution using the discretized
bins. The bounds for the discretization of continuous variables must be selected in a differentially
private manner or by leveraging public information to satisfy DP and is often a tricky part of
these methods. The majority of the teams who developed non-parametric data synthesis methods
focused on reducing the number of cells to sanitize by using techniques such as clustering variables
(i.e., creating multiple disjoint cross-tabulations on subsets of variables), maintaining only highly
correlated marginals, or using the privacy budget asymmetrically across cells.
3.1.1 Team DPSyn
Team DPSyn consistently performed well throughout the entire NIST PSCR Data Challenge, plac-
ing second in all three matches. The team’s mechanism (DPSyn) works by clustering similar
variables (based on attributes, the specific utility objective, etc.) and perturbing the cell counts
of the joint histograms for each cluster. This approach lessens the noise necessary because it re-
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duces the total number of cells, but at the price of sacrificing the correlations between variables
in different clusters. Identifying the correlations from the public data, DPSyn constructs the 1-,
2-, and 3-way marginals for all variables in each cluster, and sanitizes the counts via the Gaussian
Mechanism. For post-processing, these noisy marginals are then constrained using techniques from
Qardaji et al. (2014) to be consistent with one another. These techniques essentially check for mu-
tual consistency among the totals of the multi-way marginals (altering the counts to be consistent)
and reduce the noisy counts to zero when they are below a threshold. Finally, DPSyn generates
the synthetic data by sampling from the noisy marginals of the joined clusters.
The algorithm is straightforward, and a data practitioner could implement DPSyn fairly easily given
the simplicity and because Li et al. (2019) provided the source code (Python) and full documentation
on GitHub. The main difficulty would be selecting the variable groups for the pre-processing step,
which could be daunting for an inexperienced data practitioner or someone without familiarity of
the data set. This method is fairly novel, only being published recently, so it has yet to gain wide
acceptance in the field. That being said, its simplicity and good performance is likely to lead to
others implementing it.
3.1.2 Team Gardn999
Team Gardn999 developed the simplest mechanism, DPFieldGroups, out of the NIST PSCR Data
Challenge entrants while still performing well. They placed fifth and fourth place in Matches #2
and #3, respectively, while they did not participate in Match #1. DPFieldGroups sanitizes the
original data cell counts via the Laplace Mechanism. Similarly to DPSyn, the cells are first clustered
by identifying the highly correlated variables from the public training data set. In addition, Team
Gardn999 conducts post-processing by reducing noisy counts to zero if they fell below a threshold
calculated from  and the log10 number of bins in the particular marginal histogram. DPFieldGroups
generates the synthetic data by randomly sampling the sanitized observations from each of the
marginal histograms with a weighted probability proportional to the noisy counts.
Similarly to DPSyn, the pre-processing step for DPFieldGroups relies on the data practitioner to
cluster highly correlated variables based on public data. Once the variables are grouped, the data
practitioner can execute the Java code hosted on GitHub (Gardner, 2019). The post-processing
step is less involved than DPSyn, only adjusting some counts down to avoid a large number of
non-zero bins. The strength of this approach lies in its simplicity. On the other hand, it has not
been published as a novel method and relies only on relatively simple DP steps. This method forms
a good case study for the performance of a simple application of a differentially private algorithm.
3.1.3 Team pfr
Team pfr placed first in Matches #1 and #2, but did not compete in Match #3. Their lack
of participation might be due to them initially designing their algorithm based on how Match
#1 scored the similarity of the original and synthetic data sets, and Match #3 used new data.
Specifically, they targeted maximizing accuracy on the 3-way marginal counts, and the variables
that involve the Emergency Call Data and Time information. Before sanitizing the 3-way marginals,
their pre-processing step depends on the data practitioner to establish a list of:
1. variables that could be computed deterministically from other variables and therefore did
not need to be encoded, e.g., City was computed deterministically from Neighborhood.
2. histogram queries, where the data practitioner identifies the variables that are correlated or
variables that are subset of others. e.g., Supervisor District is correlated with Station Area.
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3. data set size thresholds for certain queries, where the query is discarded and the corresponding
output is replaced by a uniform distribution.
The algorithm then roughly clusters the variables into three disjoint groups (Spatial, Temporal,
and Call-Information groups), and identifies within each group which variables are computed deter-
ministically from other variables and which variables are highly correlated. Clustering the variables
in this manner reduces the total possible combinations of cells that need sanitizing. For the sani-
tizing step, pfr’s mechanism sanitizes the cell counts in each group of variables separately via the
Laplace mechanism. The privacy budget is allocated proportionally to the number of variables
in each group. e.g., Call-Information had 10 variables out of 32 possible, so a total of ≈ 0.31
privacy budget. Additionally, pfr’s approach “denoises” the counts based on modeling the number
of empty and non-empty cells to reduce the excessive non-zero counts created during the sanitizing
step. Some variables do not get grouped with others, and their values are generated simply by
sampling from a uniform distribution. Finally all counts are normalized to the desired synthetic
data set size.
Overall, the typical data practitioner would have to hand-code the pfr algorithm given the lack
of open source code (the team did not share their code on GitHub) or existing publication of the
approach. Also, the pfr method depends heavily on the publicly available information for query
selection to improve accuracy, so this method would likely perform poorly on data sets with little
to no associated public knowledge. Team pfr may not publish or get credit in the literature for
these ideas, but they demonstrated how simpler DP methods that intelligently leverage public or
domain knowledge can perform well in practice.
3.2 Parametric Data Synthesis
Parametric differentially private synthetic data methods rely on using or learning an appropriate
parameterized distribution based on the original data and sampling values from that distribution
with noisy parameters. One of the concerns when applying a parametric approach is the distribution
or model selection itself might violate privacy. Either the data practitioner has to use a separate
public data set to test what model is appropriate or leverage public knowledge on what model
should be used to avoid a privacy violation. If this is not possible, the data practitioner may apply
a differentially private model selection method (Lei et al., 2018). These methods are generally much
more computationally demanding than the non-parametric methods.
3.2.1 Team PrivBayes
Team PrivBayes has a well developed DP approach, PrivBayes, that they fully detailed in their
paper (Zhang et al., 2017). They placed fifth in Match #1 and third in Matches #2 and #3.
Simply put, PrivBayes uses a Bayesian network with binary nodes and low-order interactions among
the nodes to release high-dimensional data that satisfies differential privacy. PrivBayes creates a
Bayesian network by first scoring each pair of possible attributes that indicates if the attributes
are highly correlated or not. These scores are sanitized via the Gaussian Mechanism and then
used to create the Bayesian network. When the attributes contain continuous values, PrivBayes
must discretize the values to create the Bayesian network. Using the differentially private Bayesian
network, PrivBayes approximates the distribution of the original data with a set of P many low-
dimensional marginals. These P marginals are then santitized via the Gaussian Mechanism, and
the noisy marginals are used with the Bayesian network to reconstruct an approximate distribution
of the original data set. PrivBayes then generates the synthetic data by sampling tuples from this
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approximated distribution, and post-processed to enforce consistency on the noisy marginals in
three parts: 1. marginal set of attributes, 2. attribute hierarchy, and 3. overall consistency.
PrivBayes performs fairly well while not requiring public data for a pre-processing step such as the
non-parametric approaches described in Section 3.1. Additionally, there exists PrivBayes Python
code on GitHub (Ping, 2018; Ping and Stoyanovich, 2017), allowing data practitioners to easily
apply PrivBayes to their data. However, the complexity of PrivBayes due to constructing the dif-
ferentially private Bayesian network and enforcing consistency among the noisy marginals increases
the computational burden compared to the other methods. A data practitioner might be limited
in implementing PrivBayes depending on computational resources and the size of the target data
set. The complexity of the approach, notably the unsupervised identification of the network, also
means that it is harder to diagnose potential issues that may lead to inaccurate synthesis. While
the empirical methods are easy to tune to public data, PrivBayes essentially represents a black-box
method. That being said, the well founded theory and representation in the literature is a boon to
its potential use.
3.2.2 Team RMcKenna
Team RMcKenna performed third in Match #1, fourth in Match #2, and first in Match #3. Their
approach is more similar to a parametric than a non-parametric approach, since the algorithm
focuses on determining a subset of histogram cells to perturb and then sampling data from these
noisy marginals. As a first step, Team RMcKenna’s mechanism uses a similar pre-processing step to
the non-parametric methods by first identifying the 1-, 2-, 3-way marginals of the highly correlated
variables on a public data set to avoid splitting the privacy-loss budget more than necessary.
Similarly to DPSyn, the marginal counts are then sanitized via the Gaussian Mechanism, but
RMcKenna also utilizes the Moments Accountant, a privacy-loss tracking technique that tightens
the privacy bound for the Gaussian Mechanism better than Theorem 1, resulting in less noise
on the marginals (Abadi et al., 2016). Based on the sanitized marginals, Team RMcKenna uses
graphical models to determine a model for the data distribution, capturing the relationships among
the variables and enabling synthetic data generation (McKenna et al., 2019).
Team RMcKenna’s method is fairly easy to understand, resembling the implementation steps for
DPSyn and DPFieldGroups, while utilizing some more advance techniques for splitting the privacy
budget across cells and sampling from the noisy marginals. The combination of the parametric
and non-parametric ideas offers a unique approach among the competitors. The algorithm is also
straightforward to implement, requiring only some pre-processing work. The data practitioner
must first select the highly correlated variables for the low dimensional marginals before executing
the Python code from McKenna (2019) on GitHub. This approach is fairly novel and, given its
performance and the fact that it builds on previous work, it will likely gain acceptance in the
literature.
3.2.3 Team UCLANESL
Team UCLANESL placed fourth in Match #1, fifth in Match #3, and they did not compete
in Match #2. They based their mechanism on the Wasserstein generative adversarial network
(WGAN) training algorithm along with the Gaussian Mechanism and the Moment Accountant
technique to ensure DP (Arjovsky et al., 2017). First, WGAN trains two competing models: the
generator, a model that learns to generate synthetic data from the target data, and the discrimi-
nator, a model that attempts to differentiate between observations from the training data and the
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generator created synthetic data. The generator creates fake observations that mimic ones from
the target data by taking in a noisy vector sampled from a prior distribution such as a normal or
uniform distribution. These fake observations attempt to confuse the discriminator, reducing the
model’s ability to distinguish the target and synthetic data sets. For the models to be differentially
private, the discriminator gradient updates are perturbed using the Gaussian mechanism. Essen-
tially, the discriminator gradient updates are first “clipped” to ensure a bounded l2 sensitivity
before adding noise from the Gaussian Mechanism. These sanitized gradient updates are then used
on the discriminator model weights, which means the generator model also satisfies DP since it
relies on the feedback from the discriminator. The Moment Account technique comes in to track
the privacy-loss budget and will abort the WGAN training if the privacy budget has been reached.
For further details, Alzantot and Srivastava (2019) provides a full technical report with proofs in
addition to their Python code. As a published paper with publicly available code, this method
could become commonly implemented. However, Team UCLANESL’s method is the most com-
putationally intense out of all the competitors, and in particular their method consumes a lot of
memory. Team UCLANESL’s Python code includes the TensorFlow library, a GPU-accelerated
deep learning framework, that they report significantly reduces the computational time when the
code runs on a GPU-powered machine. For this reason, we suspect the average data provider, who
does not have access to a GPU, will have extreme difficulties implementing the DP WGAN method
given the computational resources required.
3.3 Summary of the NIST PSCR Challenge Synthesis Algorithms
We offer our high-level evaluation of the contestants’ algorithms based on their theoretical strengths
and weaknesses and their commonalities and dissimilarities. We also consider the relative applicabil-
ity for a practitioner wishing to release data based on the required pre-processing and computational
demands of each algorithm. Table 1 provides summaries of each algorithm.
The three non-parametric algorithms function similarly, relying on developing histograms with
reduced numbers of cells and perturbing the counts. These methods then draw the synthetic values
from these noisy marginals. The differences come from how they construct the histograms, how
they allocate the privacy budget, and what post-processing they use. In fact, teams DPSyn and
Gardn999 have almost the exact same core approach, except with DPSyn offering additional pre-
and post-processing techniques. In contrast, the parametric approaches vary significantly from
one another. Team PrivBayes relies on Bayesian networks, UCLANESL uses a GAN technique,
and RMcKenna layers a graphical model on top of a perturbed histogram. This highlights the
fact that non-parametric algorithms require the most hands-on work apart from the actual privacy
mechanism, while parametric algorithms focus on optimizing the privacy mechanism itself.
Overall the non-parametric methods are much less computationally demanding, but require more
pre-processing work such as analyzing public data to identify correlations and important marginals.
For a data provider wishing to implement one of these methods, understanding this trade-off will
help them choose an appropriate approach for their situation. Only one method, PrivBayes, truly
qualifies as an “off-the-shelf” method, such that it requires no prep work or additional coding to
run it. Although Team UCLANESL has open-source code and does not require additional coding,
the approach requires such significant computational resources, namely a GPU, that we expect few
practitioners could run it in practice without changes to their computational environment. The
other four teams’ algorithms (DPSyn, Gardn999, pfr, and RMcKenna) need detailed pre-processing
before running the code. These four methods assume access to accurate public data, so scenarios
without such available information would not benefit from implementing one of these algorithms.
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Table 1: Summary of the non-parametric and parametric differentially private synthetic data ap-
proaches discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Non-Parametric Synthesis Approaches
Team Computation
Off-the-Shelf vs.
Hand-Coding
Pre- and Post-Processing
Team DPSyn
(Sec. 3.1.1)
light to moderate
computational
complexity
some hand-coding
due to identifying
marginals for
pre-processing,
Python code
available on GitHub
pre-processing: identify
marginals from public data;
post-processing: adjust
noisy marginals to be
consistent and change counts
to zero below a threshold
Team Gardn999
(Sec. 3.1.2)
simplest and
fastest method
some hand-coding
due to identifying
marginals for
pre-processing, Java
code available on
GitHub
pre-processing: identify
marginals from public data;
post-processing: adjust the
overall counts based on a
threshold to avoid a large
number of non-zero bins
Team pfr
(Sec. 3.1.3)
simple and quick
after
pre-processing
hand-coding
required, no public
code available
pre-processing: identify
marginals from public data;
post-processing: reduce
the number of non-empty
cells from sanitization by
modeling the noisy cell
counts
Parametric Synthesis Approaches
Team Computation
Off-the-Shelf vs.
Hand-Coding
Pre- and Post-Processing
Team PrivBayes
(Sec. 3.2.1)
more
computationally
complex
compared to the
other methods
off-the-shelf via
Python code on
GitHub
pre-processing: automated
Bayesian network to
determine which variables are
highly correlated or not;
post-processing: enforcing
consistency among the
marginals
Team RMcKenna
(Sec. 3.2.2)
light to moderate
computational
complexity
some hand-coding
due to identifying
marginals for
pre-processing,
Python code on
GitHub
pre-processing: identify
marginals from public data
Team UCLANESL
(Sec. 3.2.3)
the most
computationally
complex method;
requires more
RAM memory
off-the-shelf via
Python code on
GitHub
none
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Based on the descriptions of the methods, we expect data practitioners would most easily adopt
DPSyn (or to a lesser extent Gardn999’s DPFieldGroups) and PrivBayes. The former requires little
computational or technical understanding, but it does require some effort with public information
beforehand. PrivBayes on the other hand is truly off-the-shelf and could be applied without
pre-processing based on public data, assuming the practitioner has the required computational
abilities. In contrast, teams pfr, RMcKenna, and UCLANESL offer more complex approaches that
may provide good results for more expert users.
4 Metrics to Evaluate the Synthetic Data Quality
In this section, we describe the scoring methods used for the NIST PSCR Differential Privacy
Synthetic Data Challenge. We also detail the quality metrics we used for additional evaluation
of the DP synthetic data sets, which includes general joint distributional level measures, marginal
distributional differences, and differences in specific fitted regression models.
4.1 NIST PSCR Differential Privacy Synthetic Data Challenge Scoring
Table 2: NIST PSCR Differential Privacy Synthetic Data Challenge Marathon Match Information.
Match
Training Data Scoring Data Analyses
1
2017 SFFD’s Call for
Service Data
2016 SFFD’s Call for
Service Data
“Clustering”
2
2016 SFFD’s Call for
Service Data
2006, 2017 SFFDs Call
for Service Data
“Clustering” and
“Classification”
3 Colorado PUMS
Arizona and Vermont
PUMS
“Clustering”,
“Classification”, and
“Regression”
We summarize the data sets and scoring analyses used for the three “Marathon Matches” in Table
2 from the NIST PSCR Differential Privacy Synthetic Data Challenge. For each match, the final
scores were progressively evaluated based on bespoke “clustering”, “classification”, and “regression”
metrics. This means Match #1 had only the clustering analysis, Match #2 had the clustering and
classification analyses, and Match # 3 used all three analyses. The clustering analysis compared
the 3-way marginal density distributions between the original and synthetic data sets, where the
utility score was the absolute difference in the density distributions. NIST PSCR repeated this
calculation 100 times on randomly selected variables, and then averaged for the final clustering
score. The classification analysis first randomly picked 33% of the variables. If a particular variable
was categorical, a subset of the possible variable values were also randomly picked, whereas, if the
variable was continuous, a range of values were randomly picked. In either case, these selected
values were used to calculate how many of the observations in the synthetic and original data
matched the specific variable subset. The synthetic data matched counts were then subtracted
from the original data matched counts before taking the natural log. This natural log difference
was computed over 300 repeats, where the final classification score was the root mean-squared
on the repeats divided by ln(10−3). The term classification is slightly misleading, given that this
was essentially testing similarity between the original and synthetic data in the randomly selected
subsets of the joint distributions. Lastly, the regression analysis used a two part score system. The
first score calculated the mean-square deviation of the Gini indices in the original and synthetic
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data sets for every city, and then those values were averaged over the total number of cities in the
original data. The second score compared how the cities in the original and the synthetic data
sets were ranked on gender pay gap. The rank differences were also calculated by the mean-square
deviation. These two scores were averaged for the overall regression analysis score. Again, the term
regression is slightly misleading given that this was not a comparison of regression coefficients, as
is commonly seen in literature.
4.2 General Discriminant-based Quality Metric Algorithms
We now describe more general utility approaches to measure overall distribution similarity between
synthetic and the original data. These metrics seek to give a broad sense of how “close” the
synthetic data are to the original data. These approaches utilize the concept of propensity scores,
or predicted probabilities of group membership, to discriminate between the original and synthetic
data, where the utility metrics are calculated in different ways using the estimated propensity
scores. These methods were first developed on traditional synthetic data, but they apply to DP
synthetic data as well. The basic idea behind this approach is to train a classifier to discriminate
between two data sets. The more poorly a classifier performs, the more similar the data sets are
on a distributional level.
Woo et al. (2009) first proposed using propensity scores and summarized them into a utility metric
by calculating the mean-square difference between the propensity score estimates and the true
proportion the synthetic data within the total combined data set. Snoke et al. (2018) later coined the
value as the propensity score mean-squared error (pMSE ) and improved the pMSE by deriving its
theoretical expected value and standard deviation under certain null conditions. The authors used
these values to create standardized versions of the statistic called the pMSE -ratio and standardized
pMSE. Sakshaug and Raghunathan (2010) applied a Chi-squared test on the discretized estimated
propensity scores. Bowen et al. (2018) developed SPECKS (Synthetic data generation; Propensity
score matching; Empirical Comparison via the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance), which applies the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) distance to the predicted probabilities as the utility metric. A small KS
distance would indicate that the original and synthetic empirical CDFs are indistinguishable.
To produce the results in Section 5, we calculate the pMSE -ratio and SPECKS. Both approaches
require training and fitting classifiers to the combined original and synthetic data with a binary
indicator labeling the data set in each row. We obtain the predicted probabilities of this binary
label, and we compute the pMSE using
pMSE =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(pˆi − c)2 (7)
where N = n + n∗ is the total number of observations from both the original and synthetic data
and c = n∗/N is the proportion of observations from the synthetic data out of the total. The
value of c is typically 0.5 because synthetic data is often generated with the same number of rows
as the original data (though this constraint was not made for the NIST PSCR challenge). If we
use a parametric model for the classifier, Snoke et al. (2018) derived theorems for the expected
value under the null hypothesis that the original and synthetic data were sampled from the same
generative distribution. We calculate the expected null mean using
E(pMSE) = (k − 1)(1− c)
2c
N
(8)
such that k is the number of parameters from the classifier. If we use a non-parametric classifier, we
can approximate the null expected value using resampling techniques such as permutating the rows
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and reestimating the pMSE. After calculating the null mean pMSE, we obtain the pMSE -ratio by
dividing the observed mean pMSE calculated on the original and synthetic data by the null mean.
A pMSE -ratio value close to 1 indicates that the synthetic data is drawn from a distribution that
approximates the generative distribution of the original data. For a more in-depth discussion of
this method, its strengths and weaknesses, please see Snoke et al. (2018).
We make two changes to the original pMSE -ratio as proposed by Snoke et al. (2018). First, we
choose the best classification and regression trees (CART) models for estimating the propensity
scores using cross-validation. Because the pMSE is sensitive to the classification model, using
different levels of complexity in the CART models result in different utility values. To aid our
model choice, we set the CART complexity parameter (CP), which controls how large the trees
grow, by performing cross-validation and choosing the CP which minimized the error. This ensures
our utility does not “overfit” to the data, i.e., we use a good distributional discriminator between
the original distribution and the synthetic data. Running cross-validation for each combination of
the original data and each of the competitors’ data, we found roughly the same best CP value, so
we constrained the CP to be the same for all competitors without any additional adjustments.
Second, and more importantly, we changed how we estimate the null pMSE in the CART models.
An issue with the pairwise or permutation approach original proposed is that while it measures the
null for two data sets that came from approximately the same distribution, they did not necessarily
(and very likely did not) come from the generative distribution of the original data. In theory,
this should not matter because the null depends on the classifier model not the data, but CART
models’ complexity changes based on the data. This means in practice when you calculate the null
for CART models, the null will be larger if you use synthetic data that comes from a more varied
generative distribution. In other words, if the synthetic data sets are further apart, then the null
is larger than if the synthetic data sets are closer together. The permutation or pairwise process
produces different estimated nulls for different synthetic data models, even with the same CART
complexity parameter, but in theory (and in the parametric case) the null stays fixed regardless of
the synthetic data.
The differences in estimated null values were minimal with non-DP synthetic data, but we found
much greater variation for differentially private synthetic data. As  decreases, the noise in the
synthetic data models increases significantly such that the estimated null becomes quite large
(because each synthetic data set is very far from each other). This increase cannot be matched by
an increase in the observed pMSE, because that value is bounded above. In these situations, when
using the pMSE -ratio, we observe that the algorithm suggests “better” utility using lower  than
using higher , because the null increases with lower  and thus lowering the ratio.
In this paper, we solve this problem by instead estimating the null only using the original data.
Instead of calculating the pairwise comparisons or permuting the original data with the synthetic,
we bootstrap two times the number of rows from the original data, and we assign 0 labels to half
and 1 labels to the other half. We then calculate the pMSE, repeat this process 100 times, and
take the average value as our null pMSE. This approach ensures the null arises from the original
data, which we know came from the observed generative distribution, and the estimated null does
not differ for different synthetic sets, which it should not (and does not in the parametric classifier
case where we can use the theoretical estimates).
For SPECKS, we determine the empirical CDFs of the propensity scores for the original and
synthetic data sets separately, and then apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) distance on the two
empirical CDFs. The KS distance is the maximum distance of two empirical CDFs, where the
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synthetic and the original data have the largest separation. A smaller KS distance (close to 0)
indicates that the synthetic data preserved the original data well whereas a larger KS distance
(close to 1) means the synthetic data differs a lot from the original data. For more on this method
please see Bowen et al. (2018).
Both of these methods can be used with either simple parametric models, such as logistic regression,
or more complex non-parametric models, such as CART. For any given model, we can compare
different synthetic data sets using these metrics. One issue comes from the fact that we may obtain
different rankings if we use different classifiers. This is because models with varying complexity are
actually measuring different types of distributional similarity. A logistic regression with only main
effects, for example, only measures the accuracy of the first-order marginal distributions (simulta-
neously). A more complex CART model on the other hand is measuring high-order interactions
in the data. As was recommended in the previous work, we use different classifiers and compare
relative rankings from each set of models. This gives multiple views of the utility of the data.
4.3 Marginal Distributional Metrics and Regression Analyses
Lastly, we describe quality metrics which measure accuracy on more specific elements of the data,
such as the univariate differences between the synthetic and the original data for marginal distri-
butions or output from regression analyses. Previous DP work has frequently used measures of
marginal level differences in variables to assess the amount of noise added due to a privacy mech-
anism. Typically, the measures include the average l1 distance and the root-mean-squared error,
and the literature contains various other ways to measure the same concept. We choose to use a
scaleless distance measure, namely the p-value for a Chi-square test for categorical variables and
the p-value for a KS test for continuous variables. These measures also make sense for synthetic
data, since they measure distribution distance rather than individual value difference. In addition
to being scaleless, this approach enables us to compare the original data with various synthetic
data sets that have different numbers of observations, which were not constrained for the challenge.
We compute these values for each variable and take the average to measure marginal utility.
Previous work in the synthetic data literature also frequently compares the results from regression
models fit on both the original and synthetic data, measuring how much the analyses are effected
by the privacy mechanism. We perform two regression models based on Simon and Tamura (2009),
and we compute two specific utility metrics for each of the coefficients in the models. The first is
the confidence interval overlap measure, proposed by Karr et al. (2006), among others, which is
defined as
IO = 0.5
(
min(uo, us)−max(lo, ls)
uo − lo +
min(uo, us)−max(lo, ls)
us − ls
)
(9)
where uo, lo and us, ls are the upper and lower bounds for the original and synthetic confidence
intervals respectively. This measures how much the confidence intervals estimated on the original
and synthetic data overlap on average among all regression coefficients, where the maximum value is
1. Along with this, we calculate the standardized difference in coefficient values, i.e., |βˆo−βˆs|/se(βˆo),
used by Woo and Slavkovic (2015) and Snoke et al. (2018). This measures how far the synthetic
data coefficients lie from the original quantities instead of considering the width of the confidence
interval. A drawback to the IO measure comes from the fact that if the synthetic data have
large intervals, they will most likely cover some or most of the original interval. The standardized
difference, on the other hand, depends only on the point estimate and original coefficient variability.
Together, the two metrics allow us to more accurately assess the inferential differences between the
original and synthetic data regression models.
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4.4 Utility Metric Categories
Table 3 defines the three categories of the utility metrics we use to evaluate the synthetic data.
The metrics include both the original NIST PSCR metrics and additional metrics. We adjusted
the metrics as much as possible to be on the same scale, i.e., [0, 1], though some are not.
Table 3: Utility Metric Categories.
Marginal Distribution
Metrics
Joint Distribution
Metrics
Correlation Metrics
Chi-Sq Distance
(Categorical Variables)
pMSE -ratio
Regression Coefficient
Confidence Interval Overlap
KS Distance (Continuous
Variables)
SPECKS
Regression Coefficient
Standardized Difference
NIST PSCR ’Classification’
Task
NIST PSCR ’Clustering’
Task
NIST PSCR ’Regression’
Task
In many ways, the general and specific measures discussed in the previous sections formalize con-
cepts underlying the scoring metrics devised for the NIST PSCR Data Challenge, which also sought
to assess distributional similarity or specific analytical similarity. Correspondingly, each of our cat-
egories has one of the NIST PSCR measures, even though they are not perfect mappings. For exam-
ple, the NIST PSCR “classification” task measures 3-way marginals rather than 1-way marginals.
Our goal is to show both how the metrics within these groupings are similar and not exactly
the same. For data practitioners, the formally developed metrics offer two primary advantages
over the bespoke metrics used in the challenge. First, they will be easier to implement, and, for
many of the metrics, software already exists to compute them. Second, they have more actionable
interpretations as we have described previously.
5 Experimental Results
We summarize the results from all of the utility evaluations in this section, including the NIST
PSCR Differential Privacy Synthetic Data Challenge, the pMSE -ratio and SPECKS metrics, the
univariate distribution comparisons, and the regression models. NIST PSCR gave us access to the
original synthetic data generated by the competitors listed in Table 4. The metrics we present
provide a broader picture than those used in the challenge alone, and, from these results, we make
assessments of the different DP synthetic data algorithms.
5.1 NIST PSCR Differential Privacy Synthetic Data Challenge
For Matches #1 and #2, NIST PSCR set the privacy-loss budget at  = {0.01, 0.1, 1} and δ = 0.001
(some contestants chose not to use δ), whereas for Match #3,  was set at higher levels of {0.3, 1, 8}
and δ was kept the same. NIST PSCR increased the  values due to the increased complexity
of the PUMS data used for Match #3. Additionally, NIST PSCR asked contestants to generate
multiple differentially private data sets for each match. Matches #1 and #2 required three synthetic
replicates while Match #3 required five synthetic replicates. All contestants divided  equally across
each data set, which, per Theorem 1 (Composition), resulted in them using /m for each single
data set. Accordingly, the  used per data set in Matches #1 and #2 was {0.003, 0.03, 0.3} and for
Match #3 the per data set  was {0.06, 0.2, 1.6}.
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Table 4: NIST PSCR Differential Privacy Synthetic Data Challenge Results from the three
Marathon Matches.
Rank Match #1 Match #2 Match #3
1
Team pfr
(Sec. 3.1.3)
Team pfr
(Sec. 3.1.3)
Team RMcKenna
(Sec. 3.2.2)
2
Team DPSyn
(Sec. 3.1.1)
Team DPSyn
(Sec. 3.1.1)
Team DPSyn
(Sec. 3.1.1)
3
Team RMcKenna
(Sec. 3.2.2)
Team PrivBayes
(Sec. 3.2.1)
Team PrivBayes
(Sec. 3.2.1)
4
Team UCLANESL
(Sec. 3.2.3)
Team RMcKenna
(Sec. 3.2.2)
Team Gardn999
(Sec. 3.1.2)
5
Team PrivBayes
(Sec. 3.2.1)
Team Gardn999
(Sec. 3.1.2)
Team UCLANESL
(Sec. 3.2.3)
Figure 1: The average NIST PSCR Differential Privacy Synthetic Data Challenge score results on
a log scale for Matches #2 (2006 and 2017) and #3 (Arizona and Vermont).
Table 4 lists the team ranks while Figure 1 shows the numerical results of the challenge matches.
There are a total of six teams that ranked in the Top 5 throughout the three matches. Note that
teams Gardn999, UCLANESL, and pfr did not compete in Matches #1, #2, and #3, respectively,
so their absence from the Top 5 for each match was not due to scoring lower than rank 5.
We focus our comparison on Matches #2 and #3, since Match #1 used the same underlying data
and one of two metrics used in as Match #2. Examining the results, Match #2 shows fairly flat
scores whereas Match #3 scores slightly increased with larger  values (except for Team UCLANESL
on the Vermont data). The lack of any trend in Match #2 for increasing  is mostly likely due to the
small  values used for scoring. With these very small values of , the differentially private synthetic
data sets have lower utility for the higher privacy guarantee. For future differentially private data
challenges, using a wider range of  would help verify empirically if the methods demonstrate a
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trend towards higher accuracy as  grows. Algorithms which do not eventually asymptote towards
maximal accuracy as privacy-loss goes to infinity suggest inherent flaws and should be utilized
cautiously. A potential data practitioner seeking to determine suitable algorithms needs to test
methods at a wide enough range of privacy-loss budget values to capture the risk-utility trade-off
curve.
5.2 Evaluation of Algorithms Using Quality Metrics
Table 5: Match #2 marginal distribution utility results for the top 5 scoring competitors. Results
are averaged across multiple synthetic data sets for each test data set (2006 and 2017). Best results
for each measure are in bold.
 Entry
NIST PSCR
‘Classification’
χ2pval Mean KSpval Mean
0.01 DPSyn 0.35 <0.01 0.00
0.01 Gardn999 0.35 0.03 0.00
0.01 pfr 0.28 <0.01 0.00
0.01 PrivBayes 0.32 0.69 0.33
0.01 RMcKenna 0.36 <0.01 0.00
0.10 DPSyn 0.27 <0.01 0.00
0.10 Gardn999 0.33 0.07 0.00
0.10 pfr 0.28 0.02 <0.01
0.10 PrivBayes 0.31 0.69 0.33
0.10 RMcKenna 0.36 <0.01 0.00
1.00 DPSyn 0.25 <0.01 0.00
1.00 Gardn999 0.33 0.28 0.03
1.00 pfr 0.28 0.22 0.33
1.00 PrivBayes 0.29 0.23 0.08
1.00 RMcKenna 0.36 <0.01 0.00
Bringing in the additional general and specific utility measures outlined previously, we now break
down each algorithm’s performance based on three categories. Table 5 gives the results from Match
#2 for the marginal distribution metrics. The values for the NIST PSCR “classification” metric
range from 0 to 1 with optimal scores equal to 0. The p-value metrics also range from 0 to 1,
but 1 is the optimal value. We see that pfr and DPSyn perform well on the NIST PSCR task,
while PrivBayes performs significantly better on the univariate comparisons until  = 1. Given
the nature of the data, which includes many categorical variables with hundreds of levels and
fine-grained Date variables, it is not surprising to see poor performance of most algorithms on
the univariate measures. Perhaps more surprisingly, PrivBayes performs well on those measures
but does not claim the top spot when comparing 3-way marginals. This suggests finer levels of
algorithmic tweaking occurred for the others, pfr and DPSyn in particular, such that they matched
3-way marginals without matching 1-way marginals. For example, DPSyn post-processed the data
to ensure 3-way marginal consistency, and pfr exclusively targeted accuracy on 3-way marginals.
Next, we consider utility metrics measured on a larger number of variables jointly. The results are
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Table 6: Match #2 joint distribution utility results for the top 5 scoring competitors. Results are
averaged across multiple synthetic data sets for each test data set (2006 and 2017). Best results for
each measure are in bold.
 Entry
NIST
PSCR
‘Clustering’
pMSEratio
(log)
KSD
pMSEratio
(log)
KSD
CART GLM
0.01 DPSyn 0.43 6.50 0.99 10.35 0.94
0.01 Gardn999 0.53 6.41 0.99 10.37 0.75
0.01 pfr 0.25 6.31 0.97 11.53 1.00
0.01 PrivBayes 0.42 6.51 0.99 7.56 0.53
0.01 RMcKenna 0.40 6.51 1.00 10.31 0.92
0.10 DPSyn 0.29 6.48 0.98 10.26 0.89
0.10 Gardn999 0.44 6.42 0.99 9.95 0.57
0.10 pfr 0.22 6.30 1.00 11.69 1.00
0.10 PrivBayes 0.40 6.48 0.99 7.57 0.52
0.10 RMcKenna 0.35 6.50 1.00 10.31 0.93
1.00 DPSyn 0.21 6.43 0.97 10.22 0.87
1.00 Gardn999 0.42 6.43 0.99 9.15 0.62
1.00 pfr 0.21 6.28 1.00 11.75 1.00
1.00 PrivBayes 0.39 6.48 0.99 8.46 0.54
1.00 RMcKenna 0.35 6.50 1.00 10.32 0.93
shown in Table 6. When applying the discriminant-based utility metric algorithms from Section
4.2, we implemented both CART and logistic regression with all main effects of the variables for
estimating the predicted probabilities. We used the R package rpart for CART with a CP chosen by
cross-validation. Since there were multiple synthetic data sets, we calculated the pMSE -ratio and
KS distance for each data set (using the same CP values across all data sets) and then averaged the
results. For the pMSE -ratio with the CART models, we generated 100 permutations to estimate the
null mean pMSE. Finally, we use a natural logarithmic transformation for the pMSE -ratio values,
since the values can rapidly increase on the tail. This means the optimal value for all metrics in
Table 6 is 0. The NIST PSCR metric and the KS metrics are bounded between 0 and 1, and the
pMSE -ratio values are unbounded.
We see somewhat similar results in Table 6 as we saw in Table 5. Entries by Team pfr consis-
tently performed strongest on the NIST PSCR “clustering” metric and the CART-based metrics.
Conversely, the GLM modeled propensity score approaches assigned the highest value to Team
PrivBayes. This shows that the GLM utility metrics are primarily driven by marginal distribu-
tional differences, which makes sense given the GLM we applied only models main effects with no
interactions. We also note the difference between Team DPSyn results using the NIST PSCR met-
ric versus the pMSE -ratio and SPECKS using the CART model. DPSyn clearly performs second
best overall using the NIST PSCR metric, but it only performs average based on the pMSE -ratio
and SPECKS. Recall that the “clustering” metric relied on randomly chosen subsets of one-third of
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the variables in the data and random subsets of those variables ranges. These results indicate that
Team DPSyn better preserved lower order interactions than most other algorithms, but it failed to
better preserve aspects of the full joint distribution. In general, we see more differentiation on the
lower order utility metrics, while the full joint metrics (based on the CART models) gave fairly sim-
ilar scores for all algorithms. This reflects the complex nature of the original data (which included
categorical variables with higher number of values, locations, and timestamps), and it suggests
none of the competitors differentiated themselves on capturing the whole joint distribution.
Table 7: Match #3 marginal distribution utility results for the top 5 scoring competitors. Results
are averaged across multiple synthetic data sets for each test data set (Arizona and Vermont). Best
results for each measure are in bold.
 Entry
NIST PSCR
‘Classification’
χ2pval Mean KSpval Mean
0.30 DPSyn 0.31 0.02 0.00
0.30 Gardn999 0.32 0.02 0.02
0.30 PrivBayes 0.35 0.01 0.01
0.30 RMcKenna 0.17 0.09 0.06
0.30 UCLANESL 0.72 0.00 0.00
1.00 DPSyn 0.23 0.05 0.12
1.00 Gardn999 0.28 0.04 0.15
1.00 PrivBayes 0.33 0.02 0.03
1.00 RMcKenna 0.15 0.18 0.29
1.00 UCLANESL 0.53 0.00 0.00
8.00 DPSyn 0.20 0.27 0.55
8.00 Gardn999 0.26 0.16 0.55
8.00 PrivBayes 0.31 0.03 0.11
8.00 RMcKenna 0.14 0.29 0.73
8.00 UCLANESL 0.41 0.00 0.00
Similar to the NIST PSCR scores from Figure 1, the joint utility metrics estimated from both
classifiers for Match #2 provide relatively flat values due to the very small and narrow range of 
values. In other words, we do not see large increases in utility (or even increases at all for some
algorithms) as  increases. As we will show with Match #3, using a more complex data set and
evaluating additional utility metrics provides additional levels of differentiation.
Moving to Match #3, Table 7 displays the results for the marginal distribution metrics for the top 5
contestants. The best performing algorithm from Matches #1 and #2, Team pfr, did not compete
in Match #3, so, unfortunately, we cannot compare its performance using this data. According
to this first set of measures, Team RMcKenna performed better than the others by a significant
margin, demonstrating that their algorithm improved between matches. In contrast to Match
#2, we see consistency between the NIST PSCR 3-way marginal metric and the two univariate
measures, which suggests that 1-way and 3-way marginals are more closely related on this data set.
These results also may indicate that the algorithms were not as overfit to the 3-way metric since
NIST PSCR introduced a third scoring metric for this match.
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Table 8: Match #3 joint distribution utility results for the top 5 scoring competitors. Results are
averaged across multiple synthetic data sets for each test data set (Arizona and Vermont). Best
results for each measure are in bold.
 Entry
NIST
PSCR
‘Clustering’
pMSEratio
(log)
KSD
pMSEratio
(log)
KSD
CART GLM
0.30 DPSyn 0.15 6.48 0.97 9.37 0.80
0.30 Gardn999 0.21 6.67 1.00 10.17 0.91
0.30 PrivBayes 0.23 6.01 0.99 6.30 0.33
0.30 RMcKenna 0.12 5.50 0.80 6.15 0.20
0.30
UCLANESL
0.57 6.81 1.00 11.17 1.00
1.00 DPSyn 0.11 6.39 0.90 8.33 0.71
1.00 Gardn999 0.18 6.66 0.99 9.25 0.68
1.00 PrivBayes 0.21 6.04 1.00 5.75 0.28
1.00 RMcKenna 0.09 4.46 0.56 4.57 0.23
1.00
UCLANESL
0.42 6.81 1.00 10.98 0.98
8.00 DPSyn 0.09 6.30 0.81 7.54 0.71
8.00 Gardn999 0.17 6.64 0.98 5.83 0.28
8.00 PrivBayes 0.18 6.00 0.99 5.63 0.25
8.00 RMcKenna 0.07 4.97 0.59 2.23 0.26
8.00
UCLANESL
0.35 6.80 0.99 10.80 0.91
Table 8 provides the results for each algorithm using the joint distributional metrics. In this match,
we see general agreement across the joint utility metrics and between the joint and marginal metrics.
Team RMcKenna performs the best on almost every metric and for every level of . Overall, the
contestants (the four teams who participated in both Match #2 and #3) scored much higher on
all the marginal and joint metrics for Match #3, suggesting improvements of algorithms, an easier
data set to synthesize, or some combination of the two.
Finally, we summarize the correlation utility results in Table 9. These results include the NIST
PSCR metric based on ranking cities by gender wage gap and the mean confidence interval overlap
and standardized coefficient differences for all coefficients from two regression models (one logistic,
one Poisson). Utility values could not be calculated for Team UCLANESL for certain combinations
of  and regression models, because it produced synthetic data sets with no variation in the chosen
outcome variables. These results differ from the marginal and joint measures, and there is no
consistent best performing algorithm across the metrics. Team RMcKenna performs the best on
the NIST PSCR score, apart from  = 8 whereas teams Gardn999 and PrivBayes generally rank
the best on the regression metrics. Because the NIST PSCR “regression” metric was public, we
can clearly see that DPSyn and RMcKenna allocated more privacy budget towards preserving the
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Table 9: Match #3 Correlation utility results for the top 5 scoring competitors. Results are averaged
across multiple synthetic data sets for each test data set (Arizona and Vermont). Best results for
each measure in bold.
 Entry
NIST
PSCR
‘Regression’
CI Overlap Std. βˆ Diff. CI Overlap βˆ Diff.
Model 1 Model 2
0.30 DPSyn 0.07 0.61 4.18 0.64 2.44
0.30 Gardn999 0.25 0.61 3.75 0.50 2.26
0.30 PrivBayes 0.26 0.59 4.05 0.68 2.26
0.30 RMcKenna 0.10 0.55 2.71 0.58 2.46
0.30
UCLANESL
0.22 - - - -
1.00 DPSyn 0.05 0.39 4.78 0.63 2.70
1.00 Gardn999 0.22 0.52 2.89 0.63 3.35
1.00 PrivBayes 0.27 0.63 5.57 0.56 3.19
1.00 RMcKenna 0.04 0.30 13.05 0.53 2.77
1.00
UCLANESL
0.28 0.52 9.70 - -
8.00 DPSyn 0.02 0.77 2.51 0.66 3.70
8.00 Gardn999 0.24 0.83 2.04 0.71 1.91
8.00 PrivBayes 0.26 0.61 4.85 0.70 2.71
8.00 RMcKenna 0.04 0.67 2.81 0.58 4.03
8.00
UCLANESL
0.25 0.52 15.56 - -
correlations of gender and wage within cities.
It is clear some algorithms are more amenable to privacy budget tailoring or specific allocation
than others. Teams RMcKenna and DPSyn could prioritize certain 1-, 2-, or 3-way marginals
while PrivBayes cannot because it relies on unsupervised pre-processing. Similarly, Gardn999 did
only general pre-processing to identify correlations across the whole data. This leads to our other
observation that the more general pre-processing methods contributed to better results on the
regression models. This suggests that if we do not know what models a data user plans to estimate,
we are better off using a general pre-processing step that tries to preserve all high correlations.
Unfortunately, we do not know how the RMcKenna and DPSyn algorithms would compare if they
had not prioritized certain variables, so we cannot extend this argument to the whole mechanism.
For UCLANESL, they seem to have prioritized the “regression” scoring, because it performed much
better on that metric than the other two NIST PSCR measures. Unfortunately, their approach did
not translate to other specific models, since their method did not capture correlations well based on
its very poor performance on the other regression models. Apart from UCLANESL, the other four
entries performed fairly well on preserving correlations in the data. On average, the coefficients
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in the regression models had above 60% CI overlap with the original data, and, in some cases,
70% or even 80%. These results indicate that differentially private synthetic data, particularly at
higher levels of , can perform reasonably well at preserving tasks that a statistician would typically
conduct on this type of data.
5.3 Change in Quality as Epsilon Increases
Ideally, DP algorithms should improve the quality of their output as  increases, since a higher
privacy loss implies less noise has been added to the data. However, synthetic data with substantial
pre- or post-processing may not translate directly to the -quality trade-off. While we would prefer
an algorithm that performs better at any value of  over an algorithm that performs worse, in
general, we prefer algorithms that exhibit the natural utility-privacy loss trade-off curve over those
that do not change accuracy with .
In order to visualize the change in accuracy as  increases, we utilize the radarchart utility plots
as proposed by Arnold and Neunhoeffer (2020). This graphic allows us to visualize all the utility
metrics simultaneously and perform a relative comparison to see which algorithms performed well
on what types of metrics. Figures 2 and 3 show the utility plot for two competitors’, RMcKenna
and Gardn999, Match #2 and #3 results. Each plot displays the utility for a given algorithm on
each metric, and the different colored segments of the plot represent the utility categories which
we defined earlier. Red regions denote the marginal utility metrics, blue regions denote the joint
utility metrics, and yellow denotes the correlation metrics. The different shaded areas correspond
to each level of . The amount of shaded area expanding towards the edge of the chart indicates
increasing utility values for the corresponding metrics. These charts offer a nice and easy way to
quickly visualize and synthesize a lot of information both in terms of the different metrics and the
different levels of .
Figure 2: Utility plot for Team RMcKenna’s and Team Gardn999’s results in Match #2.
Overall, Figure 2 displays that little change occurred in the scores for the three different values of 
in Match #2. This aligns with what we noted before, that the results at different noise levels were
mostly indiscernible due to the low  values in this match. We see that while teams RMcKenna and
Gardn999 performed similarly on the NIST PCSR metrics, Gardn999 performed better on some of
the other metrics. We also observe that RMcKenna performed almost identically for all levels of 
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Figure 3: Utility plot for Team RMcKenna’s and Team Gardn999’s results in Match #3.
while Gardn999 exhibited slight improvement as  increased.
By contrast, Figure 3 shows that, for most of the metrics in Match #3, the utility increases
with higher levels of . The only exception is RMcKenna’s results for the standardized coefficient
differences for regression model 2 (as well as very slight exceptions for the KS D metrics). But, with
a utility metric that measures accuracy on a highly specific value such as a regression coefficient, it
is understandable that a given instance might not perform as well as distributional level metrics.
While the noise on average is smaller for higher , the noise still comes from random distributions
that vary from instance to instance. Most of Gardn999’s results display steady improvement as 
increases. We also see from these charts that RMcKenna achieved stronger utility on the marginal
(red) and joint (blue) metrics, but Gardn999 performed better overall on the correlation metrics
(yellow).
Without showing the rest of the figures, we find, in general, that the non-parametric algorithms
(DPSyn, pfr, and Gardn999) showed steady improvement as  increased whereas the parametric
synthesis algorithms (RMcKenna, PrivBayes, and UCLANESL) showed either no change or some-
times decreased in utility. Overall, Gardn999 demonstrated the most direct relationship between
 and utility. Two reasons contributed to these findings. First, the parametric algorithms add
noise in a less direct fashion, drawing results from a high-dimensional distribution that must first
be approximated. The non-parametric algorithms, on the other hand, add noise directly to the
marginals. This suggests that while parametric models can produce good results, such as Team
RMcKenna, they cannot be as easily changed using different values of . Second, methods which
involve extensive post-processing introduce additional noise into the data, such that the risk-utility
trade-off does not depend directly on . Gardn999 used the least post-processing among all com-
petitors, and we see that their algorithm produced the most direct relationship between privacy
loss and utility.
6 Conclusions and Future Recommendations
In this paper, we reviewed and evaluated the top methods from PSCRs NIST Differential Privacy
Synthetic Data Challenge methods on a wide range of utility metrics. Our evaluation is the first
comparative work, to the best of our knowledge, that assesses a variety of DP synthetic data gener-
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ation mechanisms applied to complex real-world data sets and gives recommendations concerning
their accuracy and ease of implementation. For simplicity, we summarize the practical findings of
this paper in the following:
1. The best performing differentially private synthetic data algorithms utilized intelligent pre-
processing and budget allocation to significantly reduce the output domain of the synthetic
data. A surprising amount can be achieved with basic mechanisms on a simplified histogram.
2. Pre-processing and budget allocation can be done generally, such as capturing highly corre-
lated variables in the data, or they can be done more narrowly, such as preserving specific
relationships as we saw with the Match #3 “regression” tasks. These choices present a
general-specific utility trade-off.
3. Non-parametric and parametric algorithms offer an implementation trade-off between re-
quiring extensive pre-processing from using public data versus requiring significant computa-
tional capabilities. Data practitioners may choose one or the other based on their available
resources.
4. Parametric methods struggle to show clear improvement with rising , because the process
induces a lot of other noise. Post-processing also creates more noise that obscures the privacy-
utility trade-off. For data providers, who desire a straightforward risk-utility trade-off curve,
non-parametric methods with minimal post-processing will do a better job.
5. Experimental methods, namely GANs, achieved much lower utility than the simpler methods.
These methods also suffered from significant computational burdens, which typical data
practitioners might not possess. (A second team also submitted a GAN algorithm, but
the NIST PSCR competition staff could not even get the code to run.) Apart from the
computational issues, we believe UCLANESL did not perform well due to the extensive
clipping and the termination of the algorithm when the privacy budget was expended. The
GAN process likely had not optimized by the time it was aborted.
6. Match #3 showed that at higher levels of , some algorithms produced fairly high quality and
usable synthetic data. This indicates that DP synthetic data shows promise as a statistical
disclosure control approach.
For future competitions, we recommend a wider range of the privacy-loss budget to be explored for
future DP data competitions. As seen in Match #2, there was a lack of an asymptotic trend as
 increased, which made it difficult to learn much from this match. The challenge also privileged
competitors’ who honed their algorithms towards specific metrics, such as 3-way marginals. A
future challenge with more general scoring metrics might lead to competitors submitting more
generalized and useful algorithms. Additionally, the NIST PSCR data sets used in the competition
are very complex compared to what is typically seen in literature, and these results suggest such
complex data require more privacy-loss budget for greater accuracy. Elements such as structural
missing values in the Match #2 data (e.g., some emergency calls do not have an officer dispatched
to the location) or the large number of variables in Match #3 greatly increase the difficulty of
providing accurate differentially private synthetic data.
The various utility metric algorithms showed mixed rankings on which differentially private data
synthesis method performed the best. These rankings point to the difference in what the utility
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metrics measure. Given the results, we suggest that data practitioners wishing to select DP algo-
rithms for releasing data should use a suite of metrics for a more informative evaluation on the
ensemble of utility metrics. For instance, the discriminator approaches measure different types of
accuracy depending on the classifier used, and should be selected based on the desired utility im-
provements from the synthetic data compared to the original data. Besides the quality metrics we
described in Section 4, there are other ways to extensively evaluate differentially private methods
such as DPBench (Hay et al., 2016). But, as a first step, this paper contributes to the develop-
ing field of knowledge on practical comparisons between DP synthetic data algorithms. Further
applications should and will continue to be highly beneficial for data providers wishing to use DP
synthetic data approaches for future data products.
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